Facing Up to the Limits of Philosophy

Do Philosophers Know What They Are?

I work as a physician, and have been focusing on medicine for fifteen years. Only in the most recent year or two have I become really interested in philosophy in my free time—especially in the philosophy of mind. So much so, in fact, that I’ve decided to put my career on hiatus and use almost all my savings to go back to university, for as long as I can afford. Said and done, in a week's time I’m going to take my first course in philosophy of mind at Uppsala University here in Sweden (in case you forgot, this is the place where the pregnancy test was invented in the 1960’s, and the Celsius temperature scale a couple of centuries earlier). Now, why would anyone in their right mind do such a thing? Let’s just say a 40-year crisis and meditation can rewire one’s brain in unexpected ways (besides, who says I am in my right mind?).

I’m really excited about studying philosophy. But honestly, I’m also a bit worried. As I’m taking a substantial economical hit, as well as becoming increasingly aware of the impermanence and fragility of life, I want this endeavour to be time and money reasonably well spent. A crisis worth going through, so to speak. A big part of this worry is the fear that I’ve ‘lost it’, and that this ‘following my dreams’ (which I recently cooked up) is just an expression of naïve soul-searching, ADHD impulsivity and hyper-fixation. If that turns out to be the case, it’s bound to result in a bad crash.

However, the main topic of this post is another quite different worry that has been stirring in me. Perhaps because of my education and experience with patients, much of the philosophical content I encounter is very alien to me. I know this sounds pretentious, but I’ll just say it: I’m worried that much of what I’ll be taught will be high-level nonsense - sophisticated belief systems with some internal coherence and elegance, but ultimately with no firmer anchor to reality than astrology. I worry about the philosophers providing some privileged access to truth. I’m worried that my teachers will be largely ignorant of the limitations imposed on them by what they are.

Hopefully, my concerns are largely due to prematurely jumping to conclusions, or overestimating the problem. Furthermore, a substantial portion of philosophers, cognitive scientists and psychologists seem to be raising the same concerns that I am in this post (and whom I draw from). If you think I’m getting it wrong (or right!), please leave a comment below. I should also note that this post is mainly about philosophy of mind, but I think it generalises to the philosophy of free will, science, math, meta-ethics, and other areas.

Shameless Darwinian Presumptions

Before getting to ‘the Limits of Philosophy’, I must make clear what presumptions I use as my starting points. I call these my “Shameless Darwinian Presumptions”.

1. Physical stuff exists. This is deliberately vague. I take this as true independently of what the most fundamental layer of reality is (it is not even clear to me that there is such a thing as a fundamental layer). We don’t know if elementary particles really deserve the ‘elementary’ part of their name. Still, we know, beyond reasonable doubt, that there are, in one fashion or another, such things that can meaningfully be referred to as, for example, electrons. Whether electrons are fundamental, emergent manifestations in some mind-essence, simulated, or dreamt into existence, is beside the point. No matter what electrons ultimately ‘are made of’, they exist. In other words: if something walks, talks and smells like an electron, then it is an electron.

2. There are laws of physics. Again, I’m deliberately being vague: we do not know the final correct mathematical description of these laws. We can’t write down the math that describes the behaviour of physical stuff in all situations – we don’t have an established theory of everything. But crucially, there are physical laws – quite independently of whether physicists have them figured out or not. These laws are structural relationships - relationships that can, in principle, be described by math. One might object: where does math come from? What is a law of physics? This doesn’t matter! Will we ever, could we ever, figure them out? Are they deterministic? Stochastic? Never mind! For the present purposes, the sole point is that there are laws of physics, and physical stuff behaves in accordance with those laws.

Crucially, whether the laws of physics are fundamental or not, is not a question that physics can answer. This is just not accessible from the physical viewpoint (or any other viewpoint, as far as I can tell).

3. Evolution through natural selection is true. Darwin was right. Again - we certainly don’t know all the details of all the mechanisms at play in biological evolution. Darwin didn’t know about genes, and we still don’t understand, or agree on, the details of how various levels of selection interact. Is natural selection mostly at play at the level of genes, organisms or groups? Perhaps all? Perhaps it’s a misguided question? Furthermore, how much of biological evolution can be attributed to actual adaptation to the environment, as opposed to how much of it is due to ‘genetic drift’ (genetic changes in populations due to chance rather than natural selection). But the core idea? It’s correct. Complex physical patterns amount to proteins, lipids, RNA and DNA, which make up cells, which make up organisms. The genetic and epigenetic makeup of cells change due to sexual recombination, radiation, natural chemicals, imperfections in DNA replication, and other physical mechanisms. When those changes are detrimental or advantageous, reproductive fitness is affected, by definition.

A few words on physics and Planet Earth

Before moving on, let’s just address a points commonly being raised to object to various forms of physicalism about the mind. One of them concerns the laws of physics; more specifically, the point that “we don’t know everything”. As hinted at above, this claim is entirely correct. Famously, physicists have not yet figured out how to reconcile general relativity and quantum mechanics as to formulate the physics of quantum gravity. This leads to all sorts of headaches when it comes to describing exactly what’s going on inside black holes and other unearthly phenomena. But here on earth? As far as I can tell, it’s pretty clear that the Core Theory—combining Standard Model of particle physics with General Relativity—to this day has been consistent with pretty much every observation and experiment conducted down here, with only one minor revision being done in about 50 years. Will this always be the case? Who knows, probably not. In fact, physicists would love to find make a discovery that shows that the Core Theory is wrong. This is what they are hoping for! For our current purposes, however, this is beside the point. What’s important is that there are no findings in particle physics, weather phenomena, chemistry or neuroscience to suggest that the Core Theory, or something very close to it, cannot account for all behaviour of matter on our beloved blob. Whatever ones position is in the philosophy of mind, one must concede that either the Core Theory holds true in human brains, or it does not. If it does not, there is nothing to suggest this would be inaccessible to the natural sciences.

It's also worth mentioning that some people are increasingly excited about the possibility of quantum effects playing a crucial role in brains. I don’t get the hype, but who knows, they may be right. However, it seems to me that most of them are confused about the implications of any such findings. If what we think of as quantum effects (such as quantum entanglement, or whatever) are important in brains, that would indeed be surprising to many of us. Nonetheless, it would be a matter of known physical phenomena being found in new places. It’s not new physics! Unless violations to the Core Theory are looked for, found, or (at the very least) proposed, then any such idea fits neatly within the Core Theory framework and a materialistic model of the mind - it’s just more neuroscience being uncovered. It’s not like it’s uncommon to make neuroscientific discoveries that are unexpected.

Enter Anti-Darwinism

Back to the main thread of this post. If I’m not mistaken, my Shameless Darwinian Presumptions and claims about the physics on earth, by and large should not be controversial to most philosophers - although they may require some more careful ‘philosophical’ framing to be palatable. These Shameless Darwinian Presumptions – let’s call them SDP - are neutral on what is fundamental. They are neutral on whether physics describes ‘everything’ or leaves something out. Yet, a significant portion of philosophers act as if SDP is just wrong. When prompted, they claim to accept that the laws of physics govern the behaviour of matter, only to go on and make claims that are solely incompatible with their previous claim

How do they reveal these anti-Darwinian beliefs? Well, they make exceptions for certain kinds of animal behaviour. Certain patterns of muscular contractions are exempt from SDP. For certain animal behaviours, the laws of nature, as science knows them, are not sufficient to account for the coordination of the animals’ muscles! Something else is at play. Are you surprised to hear that? Even provoked, perhaps? Brace yourself, it’s about to get a lot worse.

What are these classes of animal muscular contractions that, according to said anti-Darwinian philosophers, cannot be accounted for by the traditional framework of the natural sciences? Which animals, engaging in what kind of activity, are supposed to provide reasons to suggest violations of physics, as we know it? Well, of course, they are the exception. The philosophers themselves! Duh!

You see, when these particular animal philosophers control their muscles, we must throw all we thought we knew aside. When they talk or write about consciousness, metaphysics or meta-ethics, then something special is going on. This talk is obviously not reducible to animal behaviour. Viewing philosophy itself through the lenses of anthropology and evolutionary psychology? Ridiculous! Is philosophy supposed to be part of the extended phenotype of Homo Sapiens? What reductionist madness! This must be the silliest claim ever made!

The Hard Problem of Philosophy (?)

As many others, I think it's time to face up to the Hard Problem of Philosophy. This is the widespread ignorance of what kind of thing philosophy is. To make the problem clearer and more palatable, I suggest dividing it into the Easy Problems of philosophy and the Hard Problem of Philosophy:

- The Easy Problems: how do we account for the emergence and evolution of all the different strands of philosophy and all the different positions within those strands? This should, in principle, be achievable by analysing them through the lenses of neurophysiology, neuroscience, evolutionary psychology and cultural sciences. It is not feasible for humans to ever solve the easy problems completely. Remember, we’re talking about principles here - the figuring out the broad strokes.

- The hard problem, then, is to explain the following: why are so many philosophers in denial of the constraints that nature imposes on them? Why are they prepared to admit that they are animals, and that animals themselves are natural phenomena, yet do not seem to realise that philosophy is a natural phenomenon?

Hold on a second… Coming to think of it… doesn’t this ‘hard’ problem fit neatly into the ‘easy’ problems? Hmm. If solving the easy problems explains all the strands of philosophy, and all the views within these strands, then haven’t we already accounted for the hard problem? Oh well, never mind the distinction. Let’s try again. Let’s just call it…

The Limits of Philosophy

The Limits of Philosophy can be summarised like so: philosophers are animals. There just ain’t any getting around that fact. Philosophy is, in the end, a class of animal behaviours aggregating and emerging as a subset of human culture.

It doesn’t matter how cognitively and behaviourally complex this particular activity of philosophising is, or how fervently many of its practitioners resist such a classification. That is simply not part of the relevant data. Philosophers cannot magically break free from the constraints of biological and cultural evolution, they cannot stand above it. They couldn’t when they were toddlers, and they still can’t when they are professors of philosophy.

I think philosophy is a wonderful thing, as long as we don’t grant it supernatural powers. For the philosophy of mind, accepting how the Limits of Philosophy constrains on a philosopher, the following should follow: When a philosopher insists that consciousness is not reducible to the physical in the way that a knee tendon reflex is, then one of the following scenarios must be unfolding:

A. The philosopher is forgetting that what is going on in that very moment of expressing their belief - as in every other moment – they are an animal, behaving like an animal, for the same kinds of reasons that lie behind all animals behaviour. No matter what belief an animal expresses, the formation and expression of that belief does not require us to invoke any fundamentally new kinds of explanations that violate the natural sciences. If SDP is sufficient to account the for the behaviour of plants and ants, then it is adequate to account for the philosophers too! Philosophers talk about consciousness is not special.

B. The philosopher is deliberately making a special exception for themselves, claiming other forces come into play, by virtue of philosophising really hard and really well. Most animal behaviour may fit into SDP, but not theirs, not when they’re doing philosophy. Luckily, I don’t think such an explicit philosophy-specialism is a widespread psychological phenomenon. But who knows.

C. Like B, but the philosopher does not restrict the specialness to herself. She is making a deliberate exception for expressions of consciousness in general. This gang of philosophers disagree on which organisms, or which formations of matter, and in which situations, count as expressions of consciousness. For example, some may say the natural sciences adequately can account for a dog’s urinating behaviour or the philosophers knee tendon reflex. However, when looking deeply into a dog’s eyes and seeing that there’s ‘someone home’, so to speak, or when we prompt a philosopher on how she feels, then the natural sciences fail. Different ‘C people’ draw the line in different places, and some don’t even draw a line. To them, consciousness is everywhere, perhaps consciousness is even what explains the laws of physics!

The crucial feature B and C have in common is they predict violations of the laws of physics. According to them, physics is not adequate to account for the philosophers cognitive processes resulting in her talking about what it is like to see the greyness of grey, for example). Therefore, electrons in human brains are not behaving as the hard-nosed physicalists are claiming that they do. If I pinch the philosophers arm, and she within less than a second starts expressing the intrinsic awfulness of the pain, then there are some pretty rapid and large violations of the expected behaviour of the matter in her brain, facial muscles, tongue and vocal cords. Crucially, this is an empirical claim! Propose what kinds of violations are at play and how we can look for them. Suggest explanations for why no biologist or neuroscientist has seen any signs whatsoever of matter behaving weirdly in brains. Say something, anything, to suggest a way forward!

D. Total blackout. The D philosopher either does not want to take any stance on violating physics, or she denies there are such violations. Shemay claim that physics is secondary to mind, but that physics nonetheless accurately describes how matter behaves, brains included. Most D folk do not seem to understand the issue. As physicist Sean Carroll points out to panpsychist philosopher Philip Goff, D folk often dodge the whole causal closure problem (and so does Goff, as far as I can tell). Causal closure is the problem (for the ‘D folk’) that if physics can account for the behaviour of matter (whatever matter may be!), including the matter in human brains, then the reasons that humans talk about consciousness ultimately can be accounted for completely within the physics framework. Crucially, we need not know how that happens. If ‘D folk’ accept that the laws of physics hold up in humans - they are committed to the view that it happens!

Therefore, ‘D folk’ who don’t defy the laws of physics must commit to a zombie view on philosophy of mind: the entirety of human thought on the mind throughout history is itself merely a mechanical phenomenon. There is no argument about consciousness, on either side, that that has arisen as an expression of consciousness. Whether everything is made of or mind, or in a simulation, or fundamental physics is utterly irrelevant to the emergence of beliefs in idealism or panpsychism . This brand of ‘D folk’, I am forced to conclude, deserve the foul E label*, despite their claims to the contrary. (*epiphenomenalism). They have dug their own grave.

The only way for the ‘D folk’ to somewhat coherently hold on to their position, to make it say anything meaningful at all, is to concede that there must be other forces in play. Matter must behave in ways that defies mathematical encapsulation. But, as is the case for B and C - then do the work! Tell us how! Or at least come up with a suggestion. Recognise the problem.

I hope, and believe, that A is the most common mechanism behind the hidden anti-Darwinism that is implicit in much of philosophy. This makes me hopeful. There’s a good chance many of they will one day realise their mistake. They may one day realise that cognitive biases shaped by natural selection and culture are as present in them as in any other animal, human or non-human. They may one day realise that any talk about mental properties provides not the slightest reason to exempt them from the constraints of being an animal. Whatever a philosopher may say - and it may be very well be insightful - it is animal business as usual.

More Problems, anyone?

While not mentioning it by its name, we’ve already been addressing Chalmers’ “Hard Problem of consciousness”. But let’s be explicit about it how to tackle it more directly: When a philosopher says “solving the easy problems may explain why I talk about consciousness, but it does not explain consciousness itself”, then what are we observing? Well, as always, this expression of her belief, Chalmers agrees, ultimately has neuroscientific explanations. Not only does her choice of words, her accent and her tone of voice depend on the way her neurons are wired – but the belief itself is encoded in the neuronal wiring. Likewise, me expressing my belief that her statement is a nonsensical (revealing that she models her mind like a Cartesian Theater, with a mental subject-object duality ) is entirely an expression of the way my neurons are wired.

As is well known, Chalmers classifies biological phenomena such as coordinated muscular contractions under the easy problems. Explain the easy problems, and we will know everything about why animals contract muscles the way they do. This gives rise to ‘the Hard Problem Problem’: when we have solved the easy problems for all Chalmers behaviours, then we know exactly how Chalmers models himself as an agent in the world, how he models his cognition, behaviour, and so forth. This analysis provides all the details we need to explain why he conceived of the hard problem of consciousness in the first place, and why he still insists it is valid. In fact, we will even know how why he chose exactly the words that he chose in writing his influential paper Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. Furthermore, we will know precisely the paper became so influential - since we know how everyone else responds behaviourally, too! And we will understand every example of criticism of it, too,

When we have solved all of the easy problems, we will understand precisely how biological and cultural evolution set up human psychology to resist any sort of doubt about the sheer importance, irreducibility, and realness of humans models of themselves. It’s quite a rational thing for evolution to have cooked up, isn’t it? Even without solving the easy problems, it’s not that far-fetched to claim that such psychology is to be expected in animals with complex cognition, culture, social bonding and identity building (as individuals and societies). One may even say that cultures, in humans and other Homo species, where these psychological features are not prominent, are at a clear disadvantage.

I’m repeating myself, but this is crucial: if we one day have solved the easy problems, as Chalmers believes we will, then we understand all the details of how our species models ourselves and the world, so as to behave exactly as we do. This includes all behaviour, from building a dam to writing influential religious texts or philosophy papers. All of it, on all sides of all debates, no exceptions, - this post and any comments included.

All right. So, solving the easy problems reveals all the cognitive mechanisms that make me and many others believe in functionalism. And it reveals all the cognitive mechanisms that make Chalmers and Goff resist it. It reveals all the insistence on, and resistance to, the Hard Problem of Consciousness. When we have accounted for all of that, then aren’t we done? Personally, I don’t see what else there is to explain. The fact that many of us have strong intuitions to exclaim no! (me included) just isn’t a factor to weigh in here. We are done.

New Hope

Luckily, there is hope on the horizon. David Chalmers himself seems to be increasingly waking up to the problems of his views himself. As Chalmers correctly argues, virtual reality is real reality. My guess is that he within a decade will realise that consciousness provides no exception - virtual consciousness is real consciousness.

Philip Goff, who I very much admire despite finding his beliefs deeply mistaken, admits the coherence of my favourite brand of functionalism - giving it increasingly serious thought (although his title is misleading - consciousness is perfectly real according to illusionism). I’m hopeful that he too will one day fully come to his senses – or at least upping his credence in illusionism to 30% or more. Let’s hope both Goff and Chalmers will face up properly to the Limits of Philosophy - or admit that they think their behaviour is special!

Despite all the constraints of being animals, many philosophers, as far as I can tell (Chalmers and Goff included, when they’re thinking straight) are doing great work. Philosophy of mind is, as a whole, clearly moving forward.

Please note: I don’t believe that all, or even most, of contemporary philosophy is flawed - far from it. Indeed, this post is largely drawing from philosophers I’ve read and listened to.