It sounds like you already have studied mind and matter, with your work as a physician. You already attended a lot of university for an educational experience. The logical path is to approach philosophy exactly like being a physician. New data, same process. I'm sure from your work as a physician, you know firsthand that people don't make the best logical decisions and get stuck in pattern loops that lead to reoccurring physical health problems.
Perhaps the best way to approach philosophy is not with the same pattern but opposite. The mind and philosophy might be best studied by coming to know what it is not. I would go search experiences that don't make logical sense like falling in love, working on a farm, living in the jungle, becoming a blacksmith, or studying traditional Chinese medicine. See if you can learn to love something that your mind and ego says that you already understand and its beneath you.
Fwiw I'm very sympathetic to these frustrations, and am very much in the Darwinian naturalist camp myself, but I do think the opposition is aware of kinds of difficulties you're raising though. Look for writing on the "paradox of phenomenal judgment", which is basically the puzzling fact that if certain non-physicalist views about consciousness are right, none of what those non-physicalist philosophers write and say about consciousness is influenced by the fact that they are conscious.
They have things to say in response. I don't find them persuasive, but they're not dumbfounded.
Thank you very much for this! I'm glad they're not dumbfounded and I seem to have portrayed them badly. This is good news.
I'm fascinated by the paradox you refer to. I'm struggling a bit right now to see how it's more than the obvious problem of epiphenomenonalism, but maybe that's just what it is, formalised? (or just motivated a bit better than "the obvious problem").
> I'm glad they're not dumbfounded and I seem to have portrayed them badly.
Sadly, or amusingly, it's not one thing or the other. They are not dumbfounded _and_ you portrayed them correctly.
I have come to the conclusion that most people who make such incoherent claims like you have described in your post, and will never be dumbfounded, do so because they think it gets them laid. Or whatever else they like.
And this is quite coherent with your point. We are animals.
I find your portrayal of then also very respectful and therefore I would bet no small amount that you will get a lot out of studying. You will just not come out thinking "Oh well, most of philosophy isn't bullshit" because most of it is.
I think you're confusing causal closure for "the laws of physics". Causal closure (determinism, mechanistic reductionism) is a philosophical position which many scientists take for granted, but it's not a physical law. When someone says there's always a purely physical explanation for any given phenomenon, that's not the same thing as endorsing causal closure. And admitting that any given phenomenon CAN be explained in a purely physical way doesn't mean that such is the best or final explanation. Sean Carroll presents a false dichotomy.
I don't think anything I or other "armchair" philosophers say will convince you that reduction-mechanism is not the best explanation for everything, so I'll leave you with the words of biologist Michael Levin, whose work I shared with you earlier: "...almost any paradigm can be rescued by enough epicycles; indeed, after one has discovered a new effect or reached a new capability, it is easy to drill down to the chemistry and—looking backwards—claim that there is no intelligence here because it mechanically follows the laws of physics. The same is true for any act of a complex human brain-body system—if one insists on a view from the level of particles, it will always be there."
The reason I find his work so exciting is that he's actually using philosophical ideas that have been around for a long time—teleological, holistic, top-down thinking—in his scientific work and it's bearing fruit.
Here's an interesting video with two headed worms:
As I relplied to you just now on your post, I'm a fan of Levin. I've seen that video, thanks!
I also agree with everything in that quote from him. I daresay Dennett wholeheartedly would agree with that too. I truly find his work very exciting too.
"The reason I find his work so exciting is that he's actually using philosophical ideas that have been around for a long time—teleological, holistic, top-down thinking—in his scientific work and it's bearing fruit." I agree fully. I believe Dennett very much had this approach too, and I think he was quite explicit about it. I believe this is the perhaps he even influenced Levin. For example, in "From Bacteria to Bach and Back", in chapter 3 "The Origin of Reasons" subsection "The Death or Rebirth of Teleology", he states "The biosphere is utterly saturated with design, with purpose, with reasons".
Physical explanations for animals (philosophers and physicists included) or not only not the best explanations, they actually totally SUCK. Try even explaining a relatively inert thing as a table in terms of fundamental physics? So I agree with you 100% there. So does Sean Carroll, I daresay. I don't see how any of this is in opposition to causal closure. Nor do I see how any stochastic indeterminism refutes causal closure, if you're claiming that, by not including it in your parenthesis.
If we have a accurate and complete mathematically encapsulated microphysical description of the behaviour of animals in any number of instances or situations, I think that would truly be useless for our understanding of animal behaviour (humans included). But the point of causal closure, as I see it, is that all the behaviour "falls out" naturally from the microphysics, without anything else intervening. This means that we get the same animal behaviour regardless if there is any proto-agency behind the behaviour of the microphysical or not, regardless if we live in a simulation or not, regarless if mind is fundamental or not. And what are the implications? That we get exactly the same philosophical arguments in either of those cases, and the claim becomes epiphenomenal at best, and thereby utterly empty, as far as I can tell. (perhaps I'm misapplying the term 'causal closure', but if so, I hope that this comment clarifies what I mean).
This is impressively written. I wonder if you have an opinion on something my friend and I recently debated, especially since you seem to have a confident stance on the idea that things, such as fundamental particles, do exist.
My friend says that there is a kind of thing called a "cubicle," but not the kind in an office. She defines a cubicle as any 1ft x 1ft x 1ft cube-shaped section of space, along with any gas molecules within that space. The molecules don't have to be the same molecules from moment to moment, nor a certain number of molecules. So then she points into the air in front of her and says, smugly, "Here is a cubicle. I've just proven that cubicles exist."
What she's trying to do is prove that things don't really "exist," per se, because "things" are just concepts that we fit raw reality into (whatever "raw reality" means). We speak as if things exist, because its effective to do so, but we'd have to also admit that cubicles exist if anything exists (she argues).
So would you agree with her claim that "cubicles" exist, and the implications of that claim?
Thank you Christian! Although I suspect you disagree with much of it, or my confidence, I really appreciate that. Also, sorry for late reply, I somehow missed this comment.
I think these cubicles exist in the sense that mahundreds are real. Mahundreds are mammals with an average weight of between 100 and <100 kg three years after birth. If it were a useful (in any sense) or established category, I'd say mahundreds are real. As for actual reality, where I just made that category up, whether they exist or not is a pretty meaningless question as far as I can tell. The same goes for those cubicles.
I think exactly the same is true of species, subspecies, etc. There's no truth out there in some platonic space or elsewhere whether some debated speciation has occurred or not. It's about the concepts that form the manifest image. If I understand your friend correctly, we're aligned on that part, I just disagree that it's meaningful to say that cubicles are real.
Love the critique of philosophers ignoring physics. I wonder if this occurs because our brains literally evolved to make consciousness feel special and irreducible. As you note, we are a social species. The "hard problem of consciousness" might just be our social brains (default mode network, mirror neurons, "awe circuits" in the prefrontal lobe) making inner experience feel profound and shareable so we can coordinate better with other humans. Our brains could be wired to seek awe and meaning, whether through religion or philosophy, because groups that could share subjective states outcompeted those that couldn't.
Yes that is pretty much what I believe. There are plenty of reasons for us to self-narrate, and narrate collectively, how important and special we are. Psychology looks at why and how people think, talk, and otherwise behave in various ways. Philosophers are people. If psychologists can fully account for why and how philosophers say what they say, then there is no more mystery left than if they account for what a child says or does. There is no fundamental difference there!
>. Our brains could be wired to seek awe and meaning, whether through religion or philosophy, because groups that could share subjective states outcompeted those that couldn't.
“Yet, a significant portion of philosophers act as if SDP is just wrong.”
In my opinion, they’re simply making a category error (assuming your characterization is correct): SDP is essentially itself a model, and models aren’t right or wrong, because they’re incomplete representations of something else.
Congratulations on your new pursuits in life and also for starting your own substack. I've bookmarked your site and will visit from time to time to see if there is anything interesting that I would want to comment on.
From our short and previous experience of exchanging ideas, I doubt that there will be much to discuss. Good luck and I wish you all the best.
I basically entirely agree with you, on philosophy of mind, but maybe not on how you characterise the opposition.
First, I'm not sure there's much difference between C-people and certain D-people.
C-people think the laws of physics are suspended in animals.
But some D-people may think that the laws of physics are different in animals, and so are not violated.
The difference here is in just want we refer to as the laws of physics, whether we mean the core theory, which might be violated, or just the actual laws that govern or describe all behaviour in the universe, which pretty much by definition cannot be violated.
So, I'm not really sure what you mean by D-people.
Goff, BTW, definitely does understand these problems. He is well aware of the issues with epiphenomenalism you point out, which is why he is increasingly attracted to the idea that the consciousness of people is an emergent phenomenon with causal power. He thinks evolution stumbled upon some way of unifying the consciousness of all the constituent parts of the brain into an agent with new top-down causal powers of its own, because this was adaptive. Because he thinks physics needs some sort of substance to instantiate it, and that consciousness is that substance, he identifies the unified consciousness of humans with these novel causal powers.
It's unclear if this makes him a C-person or a D-person, because you could characterise this as new physics rather than violations of the laws of physics.
To be clear, it may be possible to get similarly adaptive behaviour with supercomputers just doing computations or simulations of the high-level causal powers on hardware that itself exploits only the core theory, so the new emergent physics is not strictly necessary for this behaviour. But Goff suspects that this behaviour can be achieved more efficiently by exploiting these new causal powers in the hardware. In favour of his position, compare the wattage of a human brain compared to a top of the line LLM in performing language manipulation tasks. Early days yet, but it's far from clear that human-level performance can be achieved by computers as efficiently as brains, and it's plausible that this is because brains are exploiting unknown physics.
Note that I think this is all wrong and I'm an illusionist myself, but I think it's a pretty creative and subtle solution to the problems you pose.
Hey, you're being disagreeable in a very agreeable fashion. Thanks very much for this feedback. I agree I am probably mischaracterising the opposition. I also realise that I need to be clearer on a few points. Like when I say violate the laws of physics, I mean the core theory, what most of us expect holds up in brains. Like you point out, if physics is different in brains, it isn't violated at all. But that is a claim that should be looked for empirically.
I realise Goff and Chalmers are well aware of anything I can come up with here, and that it's nothing new!
I haven't really studied any philosophy yet, but I've listened to and watched Goff and other anti - physicalists quite a bit in my free time. What I find entirely absent in everything I have thus far encountered is any kind addressing what kinds of behaviours are plausibly explained by the mechanisms of the standard model (physics, chemistry, natural selection, biology, neuroscience) and what kinds of behaviours require something more. Where do they draw the line? Decartes was clear that all other animals are merely mechanical, but I'm not aware of antiphysicalists today being adequately explicit about why only some muscle movements require extra physics and others do not, or (roughly) where to draw the line. Is the lions roar mysterious unless there's non-physical causal effects of consciousness? And why is philosophy different from, say, calculus?
As I see it, if there's causal efficacy of non-physical consciousness, then rapidly shifting "qualia" and rapid reports of those shifting qualia would necessarily induce rapid and large unexpected behaviours of neurons. Neurons would have to be activated much more than expected from the incoming activations upstream. This wouldn't be a subtle thing. It's quite straightforward, in my mind, how to test for this, in animal studies (which I on the other hand am skeptical about).
In my understanding, the complexity of the causal structures in an LLM for producing a response is a total joke when compared to a brain producing a similar response. This is no surprise given 85 bn neurons with a hundred trillion synapses. At the same time, that number of neurons do not use less energy than expected. So I don't think this argument works at all!
Again, thanks. Really useful! Especially coming from an illusionist. Will get back on the C / D issue. Wrote most of this a bit too sloppily, unfortunately.
I don't think there is supposed to be a divide between behaviour that needs something beyond the standard model and behaviour that doesn't. Again, it's maybe not about necessity, but about efficiency. There may be ways that nature has found to exploit strong emergence to more efficiently implement intelligent behaviour.
I think Goff would suspect that all behaviours arising out of a unified consciousness are exploiting strong emergence. That's pretty much everything humans do consciously, including calculus. And it probably includes much of what animals do. And it may include what plants and bacteria do also.
Many of these behaviours are plausibly explained using the standard model, indeed. Even philosophy. But Goff takes it as a datum that we know that at least some of these behaviours are in fact driven by conscious experience, and so extrapolates that perhaps all of them are, because natural selection has found strong emergence to be usefully exploitable. But which ones are actually explicable by the standard model and which are not is not something we can't answer from the armchair. It's an empirical question.
On the subtlety point, I think I just disagree. Yes, it involves massive shifts in the movements of electrons or neurons. But we're talking about differences between Very Complex Pattern A (predicted by the standard model) and Very Complex Pattern B (what happens on strong emergence). Entirely different neurons will be activated in both scenarios, but as we currently can't really predict which neurons will be activated on the standard model (because it's too complex), we're not in a position to notice deviations from the standard model.
You say that the neurons do not use less energy than expected, but I doubt it has been calculated from first principles how much energy our neurons should use when we are performing feats of mental computation.
But, your point is well taken. The great increase in energy efficiency of the human brain over LLMs is indeed plausibly explained by its much greater complexity.
Sure, it may be more subtle than I might have come off as suggesting.. I don't expect it to be easily figured out with today's technology or anything like that. But looking for such deviations - shouldn't that be a main focus? I don't see this stance clearly declared, nor talked about. But that could simply be my limited knowledge.
On strong emergence - maybe there's something that I just don't understand. I just don't see how it helps, at all. For someone like Goff: If the standard model is wrong (quite possible) and strong emergence arises in brains, for example, how does that help to begin explain how people start talking and writing about phenomenal consciousness? What's the theory, or sketch of a theory? And what IS this fundamental consciousness? I mean, even if it somehow is right, I don't see how it's a theory of consciousness!
Am I correct to assume that people like Goff would not settle for some strong emergence that could be mathematically encapsulated, since that would just be more, undiscovered physics? In other words, no modification or extension of the standard model would do (?).
I'm clearly barking up the wrong tree, since we're in the same camp. Just airing my frustration with not understanding. And I don't want to be barking at Goff either. He's clearly very smart (and kind) and I'm sincerely trying to understand him and people like him better. Thanks for helping me do that!
> But looking for such deviations - shouldn't that be a main focus?
I think Goff would like to look for such deviations, but not being a neuroscientist or a physicist he wouldn't know where to start. It's not likely to be very easy to track whether electrons are obeying the standard model in a living human brain even if there were precise predictions of an emergent theory. He just thinks there is some strong emergence going on. He doesn't know what or how it works.
> I don't see this stance clearly declared, nor talked about
I think he may discuss some of this in his book "Why?", (look for discussion of panagentialism) but mostly I know his position from talking about it with him over a pint.
> how does that help to begin explain how people start talking and writing about phenomenal consciousness?
Recall Goff's views here.
1. It is a datum that phenomenal consicousness exists. We need to account for it.
2. Epiphenomenalism is false. Phenomenal consciousness has to have something to do with why people talk about consciousness.
3. Physics needs something to ground it.
So, strong emergence helps by giving us new physics which is responsible for people talking about phenomenal consciousness, which is grounded by phenomenal consciousness. Phenomenal consciousnsess is what realises it. Without phenomenal consciousness, then this physics would exist (and neither would any other physical system, since he's a panpsychist). It would just be a system of equations that represents no concrete thing.
We need new physics in particular because without new physics we only have the interactions of particles, which may each be instantiated by some spark of phenomenal consciousness, but there would be no unified phenomenal consciousness to explain why we talk about unified phenomenal consciousness. Unified phenomenal consciousness would be epiphenomenal. If unified phenomenal consciousness plays a causal role in why we talk about unified phenomenal consciousness, then it has to be some nonlocal strongly emergent phenomenon arising out of the brain as a whole.
> Am I correct to assume that people like Goff would not settle for some strong emergence that could be mathematically encapsulated, since that would just be more, undiscovered physics?
I've pressed him on this and he's noncommittal. He seems happy to consider the idea that the strongly emergent behaviour could be mathematically encapsulated, although I think this is incompatible with his sympathy for libertarian free will.
>I think Goff would like to look for such deviations, but not being a neuroscientist or a physicist he wouldn't know where to start. It's not likely to be very easy to track whether electrons are obeying the standard model in a living human brain even if there were precise predictions of an emergent theory.
Fair enough! Also, it's great if he's clear about predicting the Standard Model is wrong. I generally think this is (often inadvertently) very much dodged by anti-functionalists. And of course, many don't even realise the problem.
>So, strong emergence helps by giving us new physics which is responsible for people talking about phenomenal consciousness, which is grounded by phenomenal consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is what realises it.
>He seems happy to consider the idea that the strongly emergent behaviour could be mathematically encapsulated, although I think this is incompatible with his sympathy for libertarian free will.
This is clarifying. But I must still be missing something! To me, it seems just as problematic for non epiphenomenal consciousness as for libertarian free will.
Okay, so phenomenal consciousness is the basis for ordinary physics and for strongly emergent non-local physics in brains, which he's happy to consider could be described mathematically. But then the known plus the new strongly emergent physics can be described as a physical complex system and captured with math. Then we could , in principle, just do the math and give a complete account for the emergence of the very idea of panpsychism, as well as any defence thereof. It could be executed in a computer, which itself is operating merely with local interactions. For these reasons, how can physical strong emergence possiby get one out of epiphenomenalism? Even if one grants phenomenal experience lies beneath it all. I'd love to hear if you've pressed him on this too (or what mistake I may be making).
I fail to see how there could be any psycho-physical "laws" at all. For panpsychism to not be epiphenomenal, the expression of phenomenal experience as it manifests in structure (talking, writing, smiling) would have to be unpredictable, not obeying anything that math could capture. Even if that's true, does suggesting that count as a theory? (not sure). And if there are laws, we might as well call them physical laws, right?
I do believe there is non-locality going on in consciousness, but that's the beauty with computation, isn't it? Non-locality can be instantiated in local physics. Perhaps that's what makes both video games and consciousness so awesome! Okay losing focus here.
He thinks p-zombies are conceivable, so he does think that we could get all the same behaviour without the consciousness, e.g. perhaps in a (costly, inefficient) simulation that captured all the behaviour.
You'd get all the same physical behaviour, but if you get into the head of someone like Goff who thinks the hard problem is a real problem (what Zinbiel calls a hardist), that doesn't mean you'd get the idea of panpsychism or a defense of panpsychism. Because the zombies would just be making noises. They wouldn't mean anything by them. They wouldn't have any ideas or intentions to defend anything. We, as conscious beings, might interpret the sounds they are making to be expressing ideas but the only real ideas are our own.
What I think you're missing is the point that Goff just takes it as a datum that phenomenal consciousness exists. A useful exercise might be to think of a character in a novel instead of a zombie.
A character in a novel might claim to be real and conscious, but it isn't. That doesn't mean you should think you could be a character in a novel. The character in a novel just has the superficial appaearance of having beliefs and sense data etc. You actually do. So even though the arguments you make appear to parallel the arguments of a character in a novel, the arguments are justified for you and they are not for the character in a novel.
For Goff, philosophical zombies are like characters in a novel. We actually have the datum that phenomenal consciousness exists, and zombies don't. The very same arguments are justified when we make them and unjustified when zombies (appear to) make them.
> For these reasons, how can physical strong emergence possiby get one out of epiphenomenalism?
Because the consciousness is the thing doing the work. Is the silicon of a computer epiphenomenal? I don't think so. For Goff, consciousness is not some property that physical systems have. If it was, then it would be an epiphenomenal property. Instead, it is the substance physical systems are made from. If there were no such substance, then the physical systems could not exist at all. That's why it isn't epiphenomenal.
Wow Mark, ditching doctoring for a while to work on a philosophy degree! Somehow coming from you that almost seems appropriate. If you haven’t gone through Ragged Clown’s posts yet then you might find that productive, since he’s now completing such a degree at the ebb of his life. I recall some good ones with themes like “Philosophers are wrong”. You must not be tied down with a spouse and general obligations right now, so have your fun while you still can!
Though philosophy was always of natural interest to me, I never gave it much true consideration because of how adamant it’s always been that philosophers needn’t ever provide humanity with any professionally agreed upon answers. So I consider it more like an art than a science. Furthermore certain prominent people bitch it out for that as a simple waste of time. Then philosophers punch back by talking about the evils of “scientism”, which is to say trying to use science to do philosophy better than actual philosophers do. I was a bit like that for a few years when I started blogging in 2014. I think I’ve come around to appreciating philosophy as something that will always remain indeterminate however. Still I also observe that science fails in many ways given that it’s in need of various accepted principles of metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology from which to build, or the three essential domains of philosophy. So I call for the rise of at least one respected community whose only purpose would be to found science by means of various professionally accepted principles in these three areas. If philosophers ignore this call then it will be up to scientists and other interested people to formally help improve the foundation that science rests upon. With a bit of publicity I suspect that certain philosophers would decide to join, though would also want to label this as a specific type of philosophy rather than my suggested name of “meta science”. I care not what it’s called, but rather just that the worst bullshit in academia meets its end.
Sure, it may be more subtle than I might have come off as suggesting.. I don't expect it to be easily figured out with today's technology or anything like that. But looking for such deviations - shouldn't that be a main focus? I don't see this stance clearly declared, nor talked about. But that could simply be my limited knowledge.
On strong emergence - maybe there's something that I just don't understand. I just don't see how it helps, at all. For someone like Goff: If the standard model is wrong (quite possible) and strong emergence arises in brains, for example, how does that help to begin explain how people start talking and writing about phenomenal consciousness? What's the theory, or sketch of a theory? And what IS this fundamental consciousness? I mean, even if it somehow is right, I don't see how it's a theory of consciousness!
Am I correct to assume that people like Goff would not settle for some strong emergence that could be mathematically encapsulated, since that would just be more, undiscovered physics? In other words, no modification or extension of the standard model would do (?).
I'm kind of sympathetic to Goff's primary datum and that we know the realness and efficacy of consciousness for a fact. I'm just not (any longer) sympathetic to the notion that a great ape could introspectively deduce that this consciousness is not a virtual world running on a hundred trillion synapses.
I'm clearly barking up the wrong tree since I know we're on the same side (largely, at least). And I don't want to be barking at Goff either. He's clearly very smart (and kind) and I'm sincerely trying to understand him and people like him better. Thanks for helping me do that.
It sounds like you already have studied mind and matter, with your work as a physician. You already attended a lot of university for an educational experience. The logical path is to approach philosophy exactly like being a physician. New data, same process. I'm sure from your work as a physician, you know firsthand that people don't make the best logical decisions and get stuck in pattern loops that lead to reoccurring physical health problems.
Perhaps the best way to approach philosophy is not with the same pattern but opposite. The mind and philosophy might be best studied by coming to know what it is not. I would go search experiences that don't make logical sense like falling in love, working on a farm, living in the jungle, becoming a blacksmith, or studying traditional Chinese medicine. See if you can learn to love something that your mind and ego says that you already understand and its beneath you.
Best of luck in your philosophy studies Mark! I enjoyed reading your analysis. You may be interested in my brief objection to Chalmers as well: https://open.substack.com/pub/brianbinsd/p/the-simple-flaw-in-chalmers-argument
Thank you, Dr Brian! Will check out your piece!
Fwiw I'm very sympathetic to these frustrations, and am very much in the Darwinian naturalist camp myself, but I do think the opposition is aware of kinds of difficulties you're raising though. Look for writing on the "paradox of phenomenal judgment", which is basically the puzzling fact that if certain non-physicalist views about consciousness are right, none of what those non-physicalist philosophers write and say about consciousness is influenced by the fact that they are conscious.
They have things to say in response. I don't find them persuasive, but they're not dumbfounded.
Thank you very much for this! I'm glad they're not dumbfounded and I seem to have portrayed them badly. This is good news.
I'm fascinated by the paradox you refer to. I'm struggling a bit right now to see how it's more than the obvious problem of epiphenomenonalism, but maybe that's just what it is, formalised? (or just motivated a bit better than "the obvious problem").
Any way, thank you!
> I'm glad they're not dumbfounded and I seem to have portrayed them badly.
Sadly, or amusingly, it's not one thing or the other. They are not dumbfounded _and_ you portrayed them correctly.
I have come to the conclusion that most people who make such incoherent claims like you have described in your post, and will never be dumbfounded, do so because they think it gets them laid. Or whatever else they like.
And this is quite coherent with your point. We are animals.
I find your portrayal of then also very respectful and therefore I would bet no small amount that you will get a lot out of studying. You will just not come out thinking "Oh well, most of philosophy isn't bullshit" because most of it is.
I think you're confusing causal closure for "the laws of physics". Causal closure (determinism, mechanistic reductionism) is a philosophical position which many scientists take for granted, but it's not a physical law. When someone says there's always a purely physical explanation for any given phenomenon, that's not the same thing as endorsing causal closure. And admitting that any given phenomenon CAN be explained in a purely physical way doesn't mean that such is the best or final explanation. Sean Carroll presents a false dichotomy.
I don't think anything I or other "armchair" philosophers say will convince you that reduction-mechanism is not the best explanation for everything, so I'll leave you with the words of biologist Michael Levin, whose work I shared with you earlier: "...almost any paradigm can be rescued by enough epicycles; indeed, after one has discovered a new effect or reached a new capability, it is easy to drill down to the chemistry and—looking backwards—claim that there is no intelligence here because it mechanically follows the laws of physics. The same is true for any act of a complex human brain-body system—if one insists on a view from the level of particles, it will always be there."
https://www.nature.com/articles/s42003-024-06037-4
The reason I find his work so exciting is that he's actually using philosophical ideas that have been around for a long time—teleological, holistic, top-down thinking—in his scientific work and it's bearing fruit.
Here's an interesting video with two headed worms:
https://youtu.be/XheAMrS8Q1c?si=OVoyvLWMSwnfpBW3
Thank you Tina!
As I relplied to you just now on your post, I'm a fan of Levin. I've seen that video, thanks!
I also agree with everything in that quote from him. I daresay Dennett wholeheartedly would agree with that too. I truly find his work very exciting too.
"The reason I find his work so exciting is that he's actually using philosophical ideas that have been around for a long time—teleological, holistic, top-down thinking—in his scientific work and it's bearing fruit." I agree fully. I believe Dennett very much had this approach too, and I think he was quite explicit about it. I believe this is the perhaps he even influenced Levin. For example, in "From Bacteria to Bach and Back", in chapter 3 "The Origin of Reasons" subsection "The Death or Rebirth of Teleology", he states "The biosphere is utterly saturated with design, with purpose, with reasons".
Physical explanations for animals (philosophers and physicists included) or not only not the best explanations, they actually totally SUCK. Try even explaining a relatively inert thing as a table in terms of fundamental physics? So I agree with you 100% there. So does Sean Carroll, I daresay. I don't see how any of this is in opposition to causal closure. Nor do I see how any stochastic indeterminism refutes causal closure, if you're claiming that, by not including it in your parenthesis.
If we have a accurate and complete mathematically encapsulated microphysical description of the behaviour of animals in any number of instances or situations, I think that would truly be useless for our understanding of animal behaviour (humans included). But the point of causal closure, as I see it, is that all the behaviour "falls out" naturally from the microphysics, without anything else intervening. This means that we get the same animal behaviour regardless if there is any proto-agency behind the behaviour of the microphysical or not, regardless if we live in a simulation or not, regarless if mind is fundamental or not. And what are the implications? That we get exactly the same philosophical arguments in either of those cases, and the claim becomes epiphenomenal at best, and thereby utterly empty, as far as I can tell. (perhaps I'm misapplying the term 'causal closure', but if so, I hope that this comment clarifies what I mean).
This is impressively written. I wonder if you have an opinion on something my friend and I recently debated, especially since you seem to have a confident stance on the idea that things, such as fundamental particles, do exist.
My friend says that there is a kind of thing called a "cubicle," but not the kind in an office. She defines a cubicle as any 1ft x 1ft x 1ft cube-shaped section of space, along with any gas molecules within that space. The molecules don't have to be the same molecules from moment to moment, nor a certain number of molecules. So then she points into the air in front of her and says, smugly, "Here is a cubicle. I've just proven that cubicles exist."
What she's trying to do is prove that things don't really "exist," per se, because "things" are just concepts that we fit raw reality into (whatever "raw reality" means). We speak as if things exist, because its effective to do so, but we'd have to also admit that cubicles exist if anything exists (she argues).
So would you agree with her claim that "cubicles" exist, and the implications of that claim?
Thank you Christian! Although I suspect you disagree with much of it, or my confidence, I really appreciate that. Also, sorry for late reply, I somehow missed this comment.
I think these cubicles exist in the sense that mahundreds are real. Mahundreds are mammals with an average weight of between 100 and <100 kg three years after birth. If it were a useful (in any sense) or established category, I'd say mahundreds are real. As for actual reality, where I just made that category up, whether they exist or not is a pretty meaningless question as far as I can tell. The same goes for those cubicles.
I think exactly the same is true of species, subspecies, etc. There's no truth out there in some platonic space or elsewhere whether some debated speciation has occurred or not. It's about the concepts that form the manifest image. If I understand your friend correctly, we're aligned on that part, I just disagree that it's meaningful to say that cubicles are real.
Does that answer your question?
Love the critique of philosophers ignoring physics. I wonder if this occurs because our brains literally evolved to make consciousness feel special and irreducible. As you note, we are a social species. The "hard problem of consciousness" might just be our social brains (default mode network, mirror neurons, "awe circuits" in the prefrontal lobe) making inner experience feel profound and shareable so we can coordinate better with other humans. Our brains could be wired to seek awe and meaning, whether through religion or philosophy, because groups that could share subjective states outcompeted those that couldn't.
I should note though, that I don't think any of this suggests that awe and meaning are less real. They're just not fundamental in nature.
Thank you, Alyssa!
Yes that is pretty much what I believe. There are plenty of reasons for us to self-narrate, and narrate collectively, how important and special we are. Psychology looks at why and how people think, talk, and otherwise behave in various ways. Philosophers are people. If psychologists can fully account for why and how philosophers say what they say, then there is no more mystery left than if they account for what a child says or does. There is no fundamental difference there!
>. Our brains could be wired to seek awe and meaning, whether through religion or philosophy, because groups that could share subjective states outcompeted those that couldn't.
Exactly! Well said.
“Yet, a significant portion of philosophers act as if SDP is just wrong.”
In my opinion, they’re simply making a category error (assuming your characterization is correct): SDP is essentially itself a model, and models aren’t right or wrong, because they’re incomplete representations of something else.
Interesting post. Related: https://www.optimallyirrational.com/p/no-evolutionary-theory-does-not-justify
Thank you Lionel! I will check it out!
Congratulations on your new pursuits in life and also for starting your own substack. I've bookmarked your site and will visit from time to time to see if there is anything interesting that I would want to comment on.
From our short and previous experience of exchanging ideas, I doubt that there will be much to discuss. Good luck and I wish you all the best.
Thank you!! I really appreciate it.
There are three primary kinds of philosophy bc philosophy has three primary aims;
a) Truth Wisdom is about universal answers
b) Practical Wisdom is about individual solutions
( answer - framework of understanding, solution - action plan )
c) Academic Philosophy is about credentials - social acceptance proven by compliance
Here are most of the answers:
https://kaiserbasileus.substack.com/p/metaphysics-in-a-nutshell
Nice post!
I basically entirely agree with you, on philosophy of mind, but maybe not on how you characterise the opposition.
First, I'm not sure there's much difference between C-people and certain D-people.
C-people think the laws of physics are suspended in animals.
But some D-people may think that the laws of physics are different in animals, and so are not violated.
The difference here is in just want we refer to as the laws of physics, whether we mean the core theory, which might be violated, or just the actual laws that govern or describe all behaviour in the universe, which pretty much by definition cannot be violated.
So, I'm not really sure what you mean by D-people.
Goff, BTW, definitely does understand these problems. He is well aware of the issues with epiphenomenalism you point out, which is why he is increasingly attracted to the idea that the consciousness of people is an emergent phenomenon with causal power. He thinks evolution stumbled upon some way of unifying the consciousness of all the constituent parts of the brain into an agent with new top-down causal powers of its own, because this was adaptive. Because he thinks physics needs some sort of substance to instantiate it, and that consciousness is that substance, he identifies the unified consciousness of humans with these novel causal powers.
It's unclear if this makes him a C-person or a D-person, because you could characterise this as new physics rather than violations of the laws of physics.
To be clear, it may be possible to get similarly adaptive behaviour with supercomputers just doing computations or simulations of the high-level causal powers on hardware that itself exploits only the core theory, so the new emergent physics is not strictly necessary for this behaviour. But Goff suspects that this behaviour can be achieved more efficiently by exploiting these new causal powers in the hardware. In favour of his position, compare the wattage of a human brain compared to a top of the line LLM in performing language manipulation tasks. Early days yet, but it's far from clear that human-level performance can be achieved by computers as efficiently as brains, and it's plausible that this is because brains are exploiting unknown physics.
Note that I think this is all wrong and I'm an illusionist myself, but I think it's a pretty creative and subtle solution to the problems you pose.
Hey, you're being disagreeable in a very agreeable fashion. Thanks very much for this feedback. I agree I am probably mischaracterising the opposition. I also realise that I need to be clearer on a few points. Like when I say violate the laws of physics, I mean the core theory, what most of us expect holds up in brains. Like you point out, if physics is different in brains, it isn't violated at all. But that is a claim that should be looked for empirically.
I realise Goff and Chalmers are well aware of anything I can come up with here, and that it's nothing new!
I haven't really studied any philosophy yet, but I've listened to and watched Goff and other anti - physicalists quite a bit in my free time. What I find entirely absent in everything I have thus far encountered is any kind addressing what kinds of behaviours are plausibly explained by the mechanisms of the standard model (physics, chemistry, natural selection, biology, neuroscience) and what kinds of behaviours require something more. Where do they draw the line? Decartes was clear that all other animals are merely mechanical, but I'm not aware of antiphysicalists today being adequately explicit about why only some muscle movements require extra physics and others do not, or (roughly) where to draw the line. Is the lions roar mysterious unless there's non-physical causal effects of consciousness? And why is philosophy different from, say, calculus?
As I see it, if there's causal efficacy of non-physical consciousness, then rapidly shifting "qualia" and rapid reports of those shifting qualia would necessarily induce rapid and large unexpected behaviours of neurons. Neurons would have to be activated much more than expected from the incoming activations upstream. This wouldn't be a subtle thing. It's quite straightforward, in my mind, how to test for this, in animal studies (which I on the other hand am skeptical about).
In my understanding, the complexity of the causal structures in an LLM for producing a response is a total joke when compared to a brain producing a similar response. This is no surprise given 85 bn neurons with a hundred trillion synapses. At the same time, that number of neurons do not use less energy than expected. So I don't think this argument works at all!
Again, thanks. Really useful! Especially coming from an illusionist. Will get back on the C / D issue. Wrote most of this a bit too sloppily, unfortunately.
I don't think there is supposed to be a divide between behaviour that needs something beyond the standard model and behaviour that doesn't. Again, it's maybe not about necessity, but about efficiency. There may be ways that nature has found to exploit strong emergence to more efficiently implement intelligent behaviour.
I think Goff would suspect that all behaviours arising out of a unified consciousness are exploiting strong emergence. That's pretty much everything humans do consciously, including calculus. And it probably includes much of what animals do. And it may include what plants and bacteria do also.
Many of these behaviours are plausibly explained using the standard model, indeed. Even philosophy. But Goff takes it as a datum that we know that at least some of these behaviours are in fact driven by conscious experience, and so extrapolates that perhaps all of them are, because natural selection has found strong emergence to be usefully exploitable. But which ones are actually explicable by the standard model and which are not is not something we can't answer from the armchair. It's an empirical question.
On the subtlety point, I think I just disagree. Yes, it involves massive shifts in the movements of electrons or neurons. But we're talking about differences between Very Complex Pattern A (predicted by the standard model) and Very Complex Pattern B (what happens on strong emergence). Entirely different neurons will be activated in both scenarios, but as we currently can't really predict which neurons will be activated on the standard model (because it's too complex), we're not in a position to notice deviations from the standard model.
You say that the neurons do not use less energy than expected, but I doubt it has been calculated from first principles how much energy our neurons should use when we are performing feats of mental computation.
But, your point is well taken. The great increase in energy efficiency of the human brain over LLMs is indeed plausibly explained by its much greater complexity.
Thank you again. You raise some great points!
Sure, it may be more subtle than I might have come off as suggesting.. I don't expect it to be easily figured out with today's technology or anything like that. But looking for such deviations - shouldn't that be a main focus? I don't see this stance clearly declared, nor talked about. But that could simply be my limited knowledge.
On strong emergence - maybe there's something that I just don't understand. I just don't see how it helps, at all. For someone like Goff: If the standard model is wrong (quite possible) and strong emergence arises in brains, for example, how does that help to begin explain how people start talking and writing about phenomenal consciousness? What's the theory, or sketch of a theory? And what IS this fundamental consciousness? I mean, even if it somehow is right, I don't see how it's a theory of consciousness!
Am I correct to assume that people like Goff would not settle for some strong emergence that could be mathematically encapsulated, since that would just be more, undiscovered physics? In other words, no modification or extension of the standard model would do (?).
I'm clearly barking up the wrong tree, since we're in the same camp. Just airing my frustration with not understanding. And I don't want to be barking at Goff either. He's clearly very smart (and kind) and I'm sincerely trying to understand him and people like him better. Thanks for helping me do that!
> But looking for such deviations - shouldn't that be a main focus?
I think Goff would like to look for such deviations, but not being a neuroscientist or a physicist he wouldn't know where to start. It's not likely to be very easy to track whether electrons are obeying the standard model in a living human brain even if there were precise predictions of an emergent theory. He just thinks there is some strong emergence going on. He doesn't know what or how it works.
> I don't see this stance clearly declared, nor talked about
I think he may discuss some of this in his book "Why?", (look for discussion of panagentialism) but mostly I know his position from talking about it with him over a pint.
> how does that help to begin explain how people start talking and writing about phenomenal consciousness?
Recall Goff's views here.
1. It is a datum that phenomenal consicousness exists. We need to account for it.
2. Epiphenomenalism is false. Phenomenal consciousness has to have something to do with why people talk about consciousness.
3. Physics needs something to ground it.
So, strong emergence helps by giving us new physics which is responsible for people talking about phenomenal consciousness, which is grounded by phenomenal consciousness. Phenomenal consciousnsess is what realises it. Without phenomenal consciousness, then this physics would exist (and neither would any other physical system, since he's a panpsychist). It would just be a system of equations that represents no concrete thing.
We need new physics in particular because without new physics we only have the interactions of particles, which may each be instantiated by some spark of phenomenal consciousness, but there would be no unified phenomenal consciousness to explain why we talk about unified phenomenal consciousness. Unified phenomenal consciousness would be epiphenomenal. If unified phenomenal consciousness plays a causal role in why we talk about unified phenomenal consciousness, then it has to be some nonlocal strongly emergent phenomenon arising out of the brain as a whole.
> Am I correct to assume that people like Goff would not settle for some strong emergence that could be mathematically encapsulated, since that would just be more, undiscovered physics?
I've pressed him on this and he's noncommittal. He seems happy to consider the idea that the strongly emergent behaviour could be mathematically encapsulated, although I think this is incompatible with his sympathy for libertarian free will.
> Thanks for helping me do that!
My pleasure!
Thanks!!
>I think Goff would like to look for such deviations, but not being a neuroscientist or a physicist he wouldn't know where to start. It's not likely to be very easy to track whether electrons are obeying the standard model in a living human brain even if there were precise predictions of an emergent theory.
Fair enough! Also, it's great if he's clear about predicting the Standard Model is wrong. I generally think this is (often inadvertently) very much dodged by anti-functionalists. And of course, many don't even realise the problem.
>So, strong emergence helps by giving us new physics which is responsible for people talking about phenomenal consciousness, which is grounded by phenomenal consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is what realises it.
>He seems happy to consider the idea that the strongly emergent behaviour could be mathematically encapsulated, although I think this is incompatible with his sympathy for libertarian free will.
This is clarifying. But I must still be missing something! To me, it seems just as problematic for non epiphenomenal consciousness as for libertarian free will.
Okay, so phenomenal consciousness is the basis for ordinary physics and for strongly emergent non-local physics in brains, which he's happy to consider could be described mathematically. But then the known plus the new strongly emergent physics can be described as a physical complex system and captured with math. Then we could , in principle, just do the math and give a complete account for the emergence of the very idea of panpsychism, as well as any defence thereof. It could be executed in a computer, which itself is operating merely with local interactions. For these reasons, how can physical strong emergence possiby get one out of epiphenomenalism? Even if one grants phenomenal experience lies beneath it all. I'd love to hear if you've pressed him on this too (or what mistake I may be making).
I fail to see how there could be any psycho-physical "laws" at all. For panpsychism to not be epiphenomenal, the expression of phenomenal experience as it manifests in structure (talking, writing, smiling) would have to be unpredictable, not obeying anything that math could capture. Even if that's true, does suggesting that count as a theory? (not sure). And if there are laws, we might as well call them physical laws, right?
I do believe there is non-locality going on in consciousness, but that's the beauty with computation, isn't it? Non-locality can be instantiated in local physics. Perhaps that's what makes both video games and consciousness so awesome! Okay losing focus here.
Again, really appreciate it.
He thinks p-zombies are conceivable, so he does think that we could get all the same behaviour without the consciousness, e.g. perhaps in a (costly, inefficient) simulation that captured all the behaviour.
You'd get all the same physical behaviour, but if you get into the head of someone like Goff who thinks the hard problem is a real problem (what Zinbiel calls a hardist), that doesn't mean you'd get the idea of panpsychism or a defense of panpsychism. Because the zombies would just be making noises. They wouldn't mean anything by them. They wouldn't have any ideas or intentions to defend anything. We, as conscious beings, might interpret the sounds they are making to be expressing ideas but the only real ideas are our own.
What I think you're missing is the point that Goff just takes it as a datum that phenomenal consciousness exists. A useful exercise might be to think of a character in a novel instead of a zombie.
A character in a novel might claim to be real and conscious, but it isn't. That doesn't mean you should think you could be a character in a novel. The character in a novel just has the superficial appaearance of having beliefs and sense data etc. You actually do. So even though the arguments you make appear to parallel the arguments of a character in a novel, the arguments are justified for you and they are not for the character in a novel.
For Goff, philosophical zombies are like characters in a novel. We actually have the datum that phenomenal consciousness exists, and zombies don't. The very same arguments are justified when we make them and unjustified when zombies (appear to) make them.
> For these reasons, how can physical strong emergence possiby get one out of epiphenomenalism?
Because the consciousness is the thing doing the work. Is the silicon of a computer epiphenomenal? I don't think so. For Goff, consciousness is not some property that physical systems have. If it was, then it would be an epiphenomenal property. Instead, it is the substance physical systems are made from. If there were no such substance, then the physical systems could not exist at all. That's why it isn't epiphenomenal.
Wow Mark, ditching doctoring for a while to work on a philosophy degree! Somehow coming from you that almost seems appropriate. If you haven’t gone through Ragged Clown’s posts yet then you might find that productive, since he’s now completing such a degree at the ebb of his life. I recall some good ones with themes like “Philosophers are wrong”. You must not be tied down with a spouse and general obligations right now, so have your fun while you still can!
Though philosophy was always of natural interest to me, I never gave it much true consideration because of how adamant it’s always been that philosophers needn’t ever provide humanity with any professionally agreed upon answers. So I consider it more like an art than a science. Furthermore certain prominent people bitch it out for that as a simple waste of time. Then philosophers punch back by talking about the evils of “scientism”, which is to say trying to use science to do philosophy better than actual philosophers do. I was a bit like that for a few years when I started blogging in 2014. I think I’ve come around to appreciating philosophy as something that will always remain indeterminate however. Still I also observe that science fails in many ways given that it’s in need of various accepted principles of metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology from which to build, or the three essential domains of philosophy. So I call for the rise of at least one respected community whose only purpose would be to found science by means of various professionally accepted principles in these three areas. If philosophers ignore this call then it will be up to scientists and other interested people to formally help improve the foundation that science rests upon. With a bit of publicity I suspect that certain philosophers would decide to join, though would also want to label this as a specific type of philosophy rather than my suggested name of “meta science”. I care not what it’s called, but rather just that the worst bullshit in academia meets its end.
Anyway good luck with your new project!
Thanks, Eric!
Wait, which post by Ragged Clown was that? Sorry for missing it, I seem to remember you posted it earler
Actually I was just talking about his posts in general since he’s discussed working on his philosophy degree several times. But then I tend to like his stuff regardless. Try this one: https://raggedclown.substack.com/p/how-to-write-a-philosophy-essay
Then here’s another from his older Wordpress blog: https://www.raggedclown.com/2023/09/17/most-philosophers-are-wrong/
Thank you again. You raise some great points!
Sure, it may be more subtle than I might have come off as suggesting.. I don't expect it to be easily figured out with today's technology or anything like that. But looking for such deviations - shouldn't that be a main focus? I don't see this stance clearly declared, nor talked about. But that could simply be my limited knowledge.
On strong emergence - maybe there's something that I just don't understand. I just don't see how it helps, at all. For someone like Goff: If the standard model is wrong (quite possible) and strong emergence arises in brains, for example, how does that help to begin explain how people start talking and writing about phenomenal consciousness? What's the theory, or sketch of a theory? And what IS this fundamental consciousness? I mean, even if it somehow is right, I don't see how it's a theory of consciousness!
Am I correct to assume that people like Goff would not settle for some strong emergence that could be mathematically encapsulated, since that would just be more, undiscovered physics? In other words, no modification or extension of the standard model would do (?).
I'm kind of sympathetic to Goff's primary datum and that we know the realness and efficacy of consciousness for a fact. I'm just not (any longer) sympathetic to the notion that a great ape could introspectively deduce that this consciousness is not a virtual world running on a hundred trillion synapses.
I'm clearly barking up the wrong tree since I know we're on the same side (largely, at least). And I don't want to be barking at Goff either. He's clearly very smart (and kind) and I'm sincerely trying to understand him and people like him better. Thanks for helping me do that.